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008			141009s2015 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783319089034
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-319-08903-4 _2doi
040			_bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aRA410.56 _b2015 EB
100	1		_aPekarsky, Brita A.K. _994888 _0Local
245	1	4	_aThe New Drug Reimbursement Game : _bA Regulator’s Guide to Playing and Winning _cby Brita A.K. Pekarsky.
260			_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _bImprint: Adis _c2015.
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XVI, 248 páginas) _b9 ilustraciones
336			_aTexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Reframing the political economy of new drugs -- The social rate of return on investment in pharmaceutical R&D -- The value of innovation -- The shadow price -- The health shadow price -- The health shadow price and the economic context -- The `pharmaceutical R&D financing' game -- The `pharmacotherapy needs a premium' game -- Conclusion.
520	3		_aThis comprehensive text presents a rigorous framework from within which regulators can respond strategically to the claim by the pharmaceutical industry that lower drug prices today lead to a loss for the populationâ€{u3826}uture health due to less innovation. It starts with a critical review of the empirical evidence of the return to consumers on their ongoing investment into high drug prices in order to increase future innovation. The implicit, critical and unrealistic assumption inherent in these studies is identified, namely that the health budget can be expanded to purchase drugs at higher prices without an opportunity cost, for example, the foregone benefits of alternative investments in health care infrastructure. Price effectiveness analysis (PEA), is introduced. PEA informs the question of how the innovative surplus from the new drug should be allocated between the manufacturer and the consumer so as to optimise societyâ€{u3837}elfare. The method allows the decisions by the regulator and the firm to be analysed jointly by specifying the firmâ€{u3830}roduction and revenue functions in terms of the clinical innovation of a new drug; the incremental effect used in the summary metric of cost effectiveness analysis. An economic value of innovation that takes into account opportunity cost under conditions of economic efficiency in the health system is proposed: the health shadow price. The limitations of the non-strategic methods that currently inform the highly contested new drug subsidy game are presented and the relative strengths of PEA are demonstrated. Health technology assessment quantifies both the clinical innovation of a new drug and its financial impact on the health system. Cost effectiveness analysis tests the relationship between the incremental cost and incremental effect of a new drug for target patients, at a given price. PEA tests the relationship between the price of a new drug and the health of the whole population, now and into the future. It achieves this by taking into account current inefficiency in both resource allocation and the displacement process, and the relationship between price and future innovation.
988			_aSpringer_Medicine_2015
650		7	_aTecnología farmacéutica _2embne _9161127
650		7	_aFarmacias _xGestión _2embne _9275527
650	2	7	_aIndustria farmacéutica _2embne _9138366
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service) _0Local _9106996
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-08903-4 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
907			_a.b12907959 _b10-10-17 _c10-02-16
942			_2lcc _cLE
945			_aRA410.56 P453 2015 EB _g1 _ieBOOK _j0 _lmae _o- _pEUR0.00 _q- _r- _sb _t15 _u0 _v0 _w0 _x0 _y.i11575633 _z06-04-17
998			_dz _e- _feng _ggw _h4