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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			230422s2018 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031015793
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-01579-3 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aJF1005 _b2018 EB
100	1		_aMeir, Reshef, _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9688196 _d1980-
245	1	0	_aStrategic Voting _cby Reshef Meir
250			_a1st edition 2018
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2018
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XVII, 149 páginas)
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning _x1939-4616
505	0		_aPreface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Basic Notation -- Strategyproofness and the Gibbard--Satterthwaite Theorem -- Regaining Truthfulness in Voting -- Voting and Mechanism Design -- Simultaneous Voting Games -- Iterative and Sequential Voting -- Voting Heuristics -- Summary: Toward a Complete Theory of Strategic Voting -- Bibliography -- Author's Biography .
520			_aSocial choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science. The book has two parts. The first part asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users. In the second part, we ask "what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare. We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.
988			_aSynthesis Collection of Technology_2018
650		7	_2embne _9688197 _aCuestión de confianza
650		7	_2embne _9686845 _aTeoría de juegos
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031000249
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031004513
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031027079
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01579-3 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b04/2023 _dz _eIG _zSI