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008			220601s2011 sz | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031792489
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-79248-9 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aTK5105.5 _b2011 EB
100	1		_aOzdaglar, Asuman E. _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9687677
245	1	0	_aNetwork Games _cby Asu Ozdaglar, Ishai Menache
250			_a1st edition 2011
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2011
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XV, 143 páginas)
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSynthesis Lectures on Learning Networks and Algorithms _x2690-4314
505	0		_aStatic Games and Solution Concepts -- Game Theory Dynamics -- Wireline Network Games -- Wireless Network Games -- Future Perspectives.
520			_aTraditional network optimization focuses on a single control objective in a network populated by obedient users and limited dispersion of information. However, most of today's networks are large-scale with lack of access to centralized information, consist of users with diverse requirements, and are subject to dynamic changes. These factors naturally motivate a new distributed control paradigm, where the network infrastructure is kept simple and the network control functions are delegated to individual agents which make their decisions independently ("selfishly"). The interaction of multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game theory, including economic notions related to markets and incentives. This monograph studies game theoretic models of resource allocation among selfish agents in networks. The first part of the monograph introduces fundamental game theoretic topics. Emphasis is given to the analysis of dynamics in game theoretic situations, which is crucial for design and control of networked systems. The second part of the monograph applies the game theoretic tools for the analysis of resource allocation in communication networks. We set up a general model of routing in wireline networks, emphasizing the congestion problems caused by delay and packet loss. In particular, we develop a systematic approach to characterizing the inefficiencies of network equilibria, and highlight the effect of autonomous service providers on network performance. We then turn to examining distributed power control in wireless networks. We show that the resulting Nash equilibria can be efficient if the degree of freedom given to end-users is properly designed. Table of Contents: Static Games and Solution Concepts / Game Theory Dynamics / Wireline Network Games / Wireless Network Games / Future Perspectives.
988			_aSynthesis Collection of Technology_2011
650		7	_2embne _9139268 _aInformática
650		7	_2embne _9141354 _aRedes informáticas
700	1		_aMenache, Ishai _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9687678
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031792472
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031792496
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-79248-9 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b03/2023 _dz _eb _zSI