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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			220601s2019 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031021213
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-02121-3 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aHB144 _b2019 EB
100	1		_aGreenwood, Garrison W. _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9687356
245	1	0	_aOn the Study of Human Cooperation via Computer Simulation : _bWhy Existing Computer Models Fail to Tell Us Much of Anything _cby Garrison W. Greenwood
250			_a1st edition 2019
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2019
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XIV, 80 páginas)
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSynthesis Lectures on Games and Computational Intelligence _x2573-6493
505	0		_aPreface -- Acknowledgments -- Social Dilemmas -- Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Social Dilemma Games -- Spatial and Network Games -- The Case Against Weak Selection -- The Moran Process and Replicator Dynamics -- The Problems with Computer Models -- The Path Forward -- Bibliography -- Author's Biography -- Index.
520			_aCooperation is pervasive throughout nature, but its origin remains an open question. For decades, social scientists, business leaders, and economists have struggled with an important question: why is cooperation so ubiquitous among unrelated humans? The answers would have profound effects because anything that promotes cooperation leads to more productive work environments and benefits society at large. Game theory provides an ideal framework for studying social dilemmas, or those situations in which people decide whether to cooperate with others (benefitting the group) or defect by prioritizing their self-interest (benefitting only the individual). The social dilemma is formulated as a mathematical game and then programmed into a computer model. Simulating the game allows researchers to investigate potential theories to explain how cooperation emerges and what promotes its persistence. Over the past 25 years, countless papers on social dilemma games have been published, yet arguably little progress has been made. The problem is the social dilemma game models are unrealistic in the sense they contain artificial constructs that deviate from the way humans act. This book describes the shortcomings in current social dilemma game modeling techniques and provides guidance on designing more effective models. A basic introduction to game theory is provided with an emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma, the most widely studied social dilemma game. Individual chapters are provided detailing the shortcomings of weak selection, spatial games, and the Moran process. Computer model validation is also discussed at length. The recommendations found in this book should help design more realistic social dilemma game models likely to produce a better understanding of human cooperation.
988			_aSynthesis Collection of Technology_2019
650		7	_2embne _9686845 _aTeoría de juegos
650		7	_2embne _9138986 _aConducta _xSimulación por ordenador
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031001703
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031009938
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031032493
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02121-3 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b03/2023 _dz _esc _zSI