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008			220601s2014 sz | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031792663
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-79266-3 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aTK5105.5 _b2014 EB
100	1		_aParekh, Abhey _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9686505
245	1	0	_aSharing Network Resources _cby Abhey Parekh, Jean Walrand
250			_a1st edition 2014
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2014
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XVIII, 132 páginas)
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSynthesis Lectures on Learning Networks and Algorithms _x2690-4314
520			_aResource Allocation lies at the heart of network control. In the early days of the Internet the scarcest resource was bandwidth, but as the network has evolved to become an essential utility in the lives of billions, the nature of the resource allocation problem has changed. This book attempts to describe the facets of resource allocation that are most relevant to modern networks. It is targeted at graduate students and researchers who have an introductory background in networking and who desire to internalize core concepts before designing new protocols and applications. We start from the fundamental question: what problem does network resource allocation solve? This leads us, in Chapter 1, to examine what it means to satisfy a set of user applications that have different requirements of the network, and to problems in Social Choice Theory. We find that while capturing these preferences in terms of utility is clean and rigorous, there are significant limitations to this choice. Chapter 2 focuses on sharing divisible resources such as links and spectrum. Both of these resources are somewhat atypical -- a link is most accurately modeled as a queue in our context, but this leads to the analytical intractability of queueing theory, and spectrum allocation methods involve dealing with interference, a poorly understood phenomenon. Chapters 3 and 4 are introductions to two allocation workhorses: auctions and matching. In these chapters we allow the users to game the system (i.e., to be strategic), but don't allow them to collude. In Chapter 5, we relax this restriction and focus on collaboration. Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss the theoretical yet fundamental issue of stability. Here, our contribution is mostly on making a mathematically abstruse subdiscipline more accessible without losing too much generality.
988			_aSynthesis Collection of Technology_2014
650		7	_2embne _9141354 _aRedes informáticas
700	1		_aWalrand, Jean _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9686506
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031792656
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031792670
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-79266-3 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b02/2023 _dz _eb _zSI