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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			220601s2012 sz | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031015588
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aQA269 _b2012 EB
100	1		_aChalkiadakis, Georgios _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9686146
245	1	0	_aComputational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory _cby Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge
250			_a1st edition 2012
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2012
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XVI, 150 páginas)
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning _x1939-4616
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Basic Concepts -- Representations and Algorithms -- Weighted Voting Games -- Beyond Characteristic Function Games -- Coalition Structure Formation -- Advanced Topics.
520			_aCooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
988			_aSynthesis Collection of Technology_2012
650		7	_2embne _aTeoría de juegos _9686845
650		7	_2embne _9405064 _aModelos matemáticos
700	1		_aElkind, Edith _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9686147 _d1976-
700	1		_aWooldridge, Michael J. _d1966- _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _968684
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031004308
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783031026867
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b01/2023 _dz _eb _zSI