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008			220319s2022 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783030961770
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-030-96177-0 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aHD30.28 _b2022 EB
100	1		_aWallace, Rodrick _eautor _4 _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _999775
245	1	0	_aDeception and Delay in Organized Conflict : _bEssays on the Mathematical Theory of Maskirovka _cby Rodrick Wallace
250			_aFirst edition 2022
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2022
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XI, 75 páginas) _b29 ilustraciones
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aSpringerBriefs in Computational Intelligence _x2625-3712
505	0		_a1. Failure of control -- 2 Failure of institutional cognition I -- 3 Failure of institutional cognition II -- 4 The 'Self-Maskirovka' of military scientism -- 5 Extending the models.
520			_aThis book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effort-and some confidence-be converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and 'experimental' data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging 'Clausewitz Landscapes'.
988			_aSpringer_Robotics_2022
650		7	_2embne _9138073 _aEstrategia
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030961763
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030961787
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96177-0 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE _n0
998			_b03/2022 _dz _eIG _zSI