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008			220120s2022 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783030946760
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aHC79 .I55 _b2022 EB
245	0	0	_aWeb and Internet Economics : _b17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings _cedited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
250			_aFirst edition 2022
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publising _c2022
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XIV, 558 páginas) _b65 ilustraciones, 48 ilustraciones a color
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF
490	0		_aInformation Systems and Applications incl. Internet/Web and HCI _v13112
505	0		_aMechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.
520			_aThis book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
988			_aSpringer_Computer_2022
650		7	_2embne _9472251 _aInternet _xAspectos económicos _vCongresos
700	1		_aFeldman, Michal _eeditor literario
700	1		_aFu, Hu _eeditor literario
700	1		_aTalgam-Cohen, Inbal _eeditor literario
773	0		_tSpringer Nature eBook
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE _n0
998			_b03/2022 _dz _eu _zSI