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020 _a9783030731410
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-030-73141-0
_2doi
040 _aES-MaUEC
_bspa
_cES-MaUEC
_dES-MaUEC
050 4 _aQA76.9 .A25
_b2021 EB
100 1 _aLin, Yan
_eautor
_9681565
245 1 0 _aNovel Techniques in Recovering, Embedding, and Enforcing Policies for Control-Flow Integrity
_cby Yan Lin
250 _aFirst edition 2021
264 1 _aCham
_bSpringer International Publising
_c2021
300 _a1 recurso en línea (XIII, 95 páginas)
_b23 ilustraciones
336 _2rdacontent
_aTexto
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aelectrónico
_bc
338 _2rdacarrier
_arecurso electrónico
_bcr
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
490 0 _aInformation Security and Cryptography
_x2197-845X
490 0 _aComputer Science (SpringerNature-11645)
490 0 _aComputer Science (R0) (SpringerNature-43710)
505 0 _aIntroduction -- Literature Review -- When Function Signature Recovery Meets Compiler Optimization -- Control-Flow Carrying Code -- Control-Flow Integrity Enforcement with Dynamic Code Optimization -- Conclusion -- Bibliography.
520 3 _aControl-Flow Integrity (CFI) is an attractive security property with which most injected and code-reuse attacks can be defeated, including advanced attacking techniques like return-oriented programming. CFI extracts a control-flow graph (CFG) for a given program, with checks inserted before indirect branch instructions. Before executed during runtime, the checks consult the CFG to ensure that the indirect branch is allowed to reach the intended target. Hence, any sort of control-flow hijacking can be prevented. This concise volume proposes novel solutions to handle the fundamental components of CFI enforcement: accurately recovering the policy (CFG); embedding the CFI policy securely; and efficiently enforcing the CFI policy. Addressing the first component, the book systematically studies two methods that recover CFI policy based on function signature matching at the binary level, then offers a unique rule- and heuristic-based mechanism to more accurately recover function signature. To embed CFI policy securely, the book advocates a new platform that encodes the policy into the machine instructions directly without relying on consulting any read-only data structure. Finally, the work prescribes a mature dynamic-code-optimization platform called DynamoRIO to enforce the policy when needed. Key features: Provides deep understanding of Control-Flow Integrity Offers new insights on the relationship between function signature and compiler optimization Demonstrates how CFI can be more efficient than Data Execution Prevention This focused, distinctive volume will appeal to researchers, scientists, lecturers, as well as postgraduates with a background in binary analysis. Libraries, practitioners, and professionals will also benefit, depending on their missions and programs. Yan Lin is at the School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University. Her extensive foundational studies have focused on the area of cybersecurity, and her current research focuses on software security and system security.
988 _aSpringer_Computer_2021
650 7 _2embne
_aSeguridad informática
_9158200
856 4 0 _uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73141-0
_zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942 _2lcc
_cLE
998 _b02/2022
_dz
_eu
_zSI