000			02129nam a2200289 i 4500
999			_c120166 _d120166
001			120166
003			ES-MaUEC
005			20230102114028.0
006			a||||fo|||| 00| 0
007			cr cn |||||maa
008			200527t2009 enk |||fo|||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780511494666
040			_bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aKD2218 _b2009 EB
100	1		_aBlack, Oliver _972040 _d1957- _eautor
245	1	0	_aConceptual foundations of antitrust _cOliver Black
264		1	_aLondon _bCambridge University Press _c2009
300			_a1 recurso en línea
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
520	3		_aAntitrust opposes restrictions on competition, but would be unworkable if it prohibited every such restriction. Principles are therefore needed to determine the categories of restriction that should be prohibited. In the United States such principles are embodied in the doctrine of per se rules and rules of reason. There is a long-standing debate whether Article 81(1) EC does, or should, be subject to a rule of reason of the kind used by the US courts in applying section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890. In US antitrust itself there is an even older debate as to the appropriate scope of rules of reason and per se rules in the application of section 1. One reason why these debates are unresolved is that the parties lack a shared understanding of the nature of, and relations between, per se rules and rules of reason. The modest purpose of this chapter is to clarify the concepts of the two kinds of rule and to identify, at a fairly abstract level, the relations between them. I shall not be offering substantive proposals as to the kinds of conduct suitable for treatment under one or other type of rule.
650		7	_2embne _aDerecho de la competencia _zReino Unidos _9158648
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494666 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b05/2020 _dz _ea _zSI