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008			190607s2019 gw | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783030141677
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-030-14167-7 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aBF311 _b2019 EB
100	1		_aCarruthers, Glenn A. _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _9674366
245	1	4	_aThe Feeling of Embodiment _bA Case Study in Explaining Consciousness _cby Glenn Carruthers.
250			_aFirst edition 2019
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing : _bImprint: Palgrave Macmillan _c2019
300			_a recurso en línea (XIV, 186 páginas) _b5 ilustraciones
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
347			_atext file _bPDF
505	0		_aChapter 1: The Real Problem of Consciousness -- Chapter 2: The Feeling of Embodiment: Our Target of Explanation -- Chapter 3: Off-line and On-line body representations -- Chapter 4: Explaining the feeling of embodiment: The feeling of embodiment occurs when an on-line body representation is matched to an off-line prototype -- Chapter 5: And then what happens? -- Chapter 6: Implications of the Real Problem of Consciousness for the sense of Embodiment: We need a hybrid account of consciousness -- Chapter 7: Completing the Hybrid Account: Awareness is a Functionally Emergent Kind -- Chapter 8: Conclusion.
520	3		_aThis book proposes a novel and rigorous explanation of consciousness. It argues that the study of an aspect of our self-consciousness known as the 'feeling of embodiment' teaches us that there are two distinct phenomena to be targeted by an explanation of consciousness. First is an explanation of the phenomenal qualities - 'what it is like' - of the experience; and second is the subject's awareness of those qualities. Glenn Carruthers explores the phenomenal qualities of the feeling of embodiment using the tools of quality spaces, as well as the subject's awareness of those qualities as a functionally emergent property of various kinds of processing of these spaces. Where much recent work on consciousness focuses on visual experience, this book rather draws evidence from the study of self-consciousness. Carruthers argues that in light of recent methodological discoveries, awareness must be explained in terms of the organization of multiple cognitive processes. The book offers an explanation of anomalous body representations and, from that, poses a more general theory of consciousness. Ultimately this book creates a hybrid account of consciousness that explains phenomenology and awareness using different tools. It will be of great interest to all scholars of psychology and philosophy as well as anyone interested in exploring the intricacies of how we experience our bodies, what we are and how we fit into the world.
988			_aSpringer_Psychology_2019
650		7	_2embne _aProcesos cognitivos _9413145
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030141660
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030141684
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030141691
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14167-7 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b06/2020 _dz _eIG _zSI