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003			ES-MaUEC
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008			180327s2019 gw a o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783319758206
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6 _2doi
040			_bspa _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aQA76.9.A25 _bT355 2019
090		4	_aTK7888.4
100	1		_aTajik, Shahin. _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245	1	0	_aOn the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions _cby Shahin Tajik.
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2019
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XX, 79 páginas) _b36 ilustraciones, 24 ilustraciones a color
347			_atext file _bPDF
490	0		_aEngineering (Springer-11647)
490	0		_aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services _x2192-2810
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.
520	3		_aThis book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs' security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.
650		7	_2embne _aSeguridad informática _9158200
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783030093334
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783319758190
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783319758213
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
988			_aPrimersemestre_2019_Engineering
998			_aSI _cm _dz _feng _ggw _h0