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020 _a9783319979038
_9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-97903-8
_2doi
040 _aES-MaUEC
_bspa
_cES-MaUEC
050 4 _aQH331
_b2018 EB
100 1 _aCimatti, Felice
_eautor
_9669175
245 1 2 _aA Biosemiotic Ontology :
_bThe Philosophy of Giorgio Prodi
_cby Felice Cimatti
264 1 _aCham
_bSpringer International Publishing
_c2018
300 _a1 recurso en línea (V, 159 páginas)
_b20 ilustraciones, 6 ilustraciones a color
336 _aTexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _2rdamedia
_aelectrónico
_bc
338 _2rdacarrier
_arecurso electrónico
_bcr
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aBiosemiotics
_x1875-4651
_v18
505 0 _aChapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Life -- Chapter 3. Scientist because Philosopher, Philosopher because Scientist -- Chapter 4. The Line and the Circle -- Chapter 5. The Biological Model: for an anti-Cartesian semiotics -- Chapter 6. Of the Complementarity of the Sign -- Chapter 7. The Origin of Language -- Chapter 8. Attention and Consciousness -- Chapter 9. Breaking the Circle -- Chapter 10. Language and Ethics -- Chapter 11. The "Darkness" Between Aesthetics and the Sacred -- Chapter 12. Conclusion: Prodi and Italian Thought.
520 3 _aGiorgio Prodi (1928-1987) was an important Italian scientist who developed an original philosophy based on two basic assumptions: 1. life is mainly a semiotic phenomenon; 2. matter is somewhat a semiotic phenomenon. Prodi applies Peirce's cenopythagorean categories to all phenomena of life and matter: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. They are interconnected meaning that the very ontology of the world, according to Prodi, is somewhat semiotic. In fact, when one describes matter as "made of" Firstness and Secondness, this means that matter 'intrinsically' implies semiotics (with Thirdness also being present in the world). At the very heart of Prodi's theory lies a metaphysical hypothesis which is an ambitious theoretical gesture that places Prodi in an awkward position with respect to the customary philosophical tradition. In fact, his own ontology is neither dualistic nor monistic. Such a conclusion is unusual and weird, but much less unusual in present time than it was when it was first introduced. The actual resurgence of various "realisms" make Prodi's semiotic realism much more interesting than when he first proposed his philosophical approach. What is uncommon, in Prodi perspective, is that he never separated semiotics from the materiality of the world. Prodi does not agree with the "standard" structuralist view of semiosis as an artificial and unnatural activity. On the contrary, Prodi believed semiosis (that is, the interconnection between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness) lies at the very bottom of life. On one hand, Prodi maintains a strong realist stance; on the other, a realism that includes semiosis as 'natural' phenomena. This last view is very unusual because all forms, more or less, of realism exclude semiosis from nature but they frequently "reduce" semiosis to non-semiotic elements. According to Prodi, semiosis is a completely natural phenomenon.
650 7 _aBiología
_xFilosofía
_2embne
_9171024
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2005046756
_1http://viaf.org/viaf/148105729
_9106996
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319979021
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319979045
856 4 0 _uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97903-8
_zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
490 0 _aBiomedical and Life Sciences (Springer-11642)
942 _2lcc
988 _aEBSPRINGER_BIOMEDLIFE_2019
998 _aSI
_a_alco
_a_vill
_b01/2019
_cm
_dz
_ef
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_ggw
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999 _c106878
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