000			03643nam a22003855i 4500
999			_c103782 _d103782 _x1
001			103782
003			DE-He213
005			20230102113146.0
006			a||||fo|||| 00| 0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			141231s2015 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783319130095
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5 _2doi
040			_bspa _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aT57.92 _b2015 EB
245	1	0	_aGame Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security _bNetworks, Air Traffic and Emergency Departments _cedited by Kjell Hausken, Jun Zhuang.
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2015
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XIV, 310 páginas 84 ilustraciones, 28 ilustraciones a color.)
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto (visual) _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
490	0		_aSpringer Series in Reliability Engineering, _x1614-7839
490	0		_aEngineering (Springer-11647)
520	3		_aMaximizing reader insights into the roles of intelligent agents in networks, air traffic and emergency departments, this volume focuses on congestion in systems where safety and security are at stake, devoting special attention to applying game theoretic analysis of congestion to: protocols in wired and wireless networks; power generation, air transportation and emergency department overcrowding. Reviewing exhaustively the key recent research into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding, and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between the different research approaches and serves to lay the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analyzing systems where congestion occurs - which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways - this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and others may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this two volume book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the work will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.
988			_aEBSPRINGER_2018
650		7	_aTráfico aéreo _xControl _2embne _9199091
700	1		_aHausken, Kjell. _eeditor literario _4edt _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2014067469 _1http://viaf.org/viaf/54851006/
700	1		_aZhuang, Jun. _eeditor literario _4edt _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2004052993 _1http://viaf.org/viaf/100166339/
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783319130101
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783319130088
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783319366326
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b03/2019 _dz _eIG _zSI