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008			150905s2015 si | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9789812877871
024	7		_a10.1007/978-981-287-787-1 _2doi
040			_bspa _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aQA76.9.A25 _bK736 2015 EB
100	1		_aKrämer, Juliane. _eautor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _1http://viaf.org/viaf/4196152331606103260000/
245	1	0	_aWhy Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity _cby Juliane Krämer.
250			_a1st edition
264		1	_aSingapore _bSpringer International Publishing _c2015
300			_a1 recurso en línea (XXI, 122 páginas 26 ilustraciones, 15 ilustraciones a color.)
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto (visual) _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
490	0		_aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services, _x2192-2810
490	0		_aEngineering (Springer-11647)
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Mathematical and Cryptological Background -- Photonic Emission Analysis -- The Photonic Side Channel -- Higher-Order Fault Attacks against Pairing Computations -- Future Work and Conclusion.
520	3		_aThis book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either. Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone, and as such cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, whether they have already been successfully implemented or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is sufficiently understood.
988			_aEBSPRINGER_2018
650		7	_aSeguridad informática _2embne _9158200
650		7	_2embne _aCriptografía (Informática) _9158201
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9789812877864
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9789812877888
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9789811012990
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b03/2019 _dz _eIG _zSI