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008			180228s2018 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783319758718
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8 _2doi
040			_aES-MaUEC _bspa _cES-MaUEC _dES-MaUEC
050		4	_aTK5105.59 _b2018 EB
100	1		_aHe, Xiaofan _eautor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2011050344 _1http://viaf.org/viaf/97121854/ _9673016
245	1	0	_aDynamic Games for Network Security _cby Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai.
264		1	_aCham _bSpringer International Publishing _c2018
300			_a1 recurso en línea (X, 74 páginas)
336			_2rdacontent _aTexto _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aelectrónico _bc
338			_2rdacarrier _arecurso electrónico _bcr
347			_atext file _bPDF
490	0		_aSpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering _x2191-8112
490	0		_aEngineering (Springer-11647)
520	3		_aThe goal of this SpringerBrief is to collect and systematically present the state-of-the-art in this research field and the underlying game-theoretic and learning tools to the broader audience with general network security and engineering backgrounds. Particularly, the exposition of this book begins with a brief introduction of relevant background knowledge in Chapter 1, followed by a review of existing applications of SG in addressing various dynamic network security problems in Chapter 2. A detailed treatment of dynamic security games with information asymmetry is given in Chapters 3-5. Specifically, dynamic security games with extra information that concerns security competitions, where the defender has an informational advantage over the adversary are discussed in Chapter 3. The complementary scenarios where the defender lacks information about the adversary is examined in Chapter 4 through the lens of incomplete information SG. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of how to proactively create information asymmetry for the defender's benefit. The primary audience for this brief includes network engineers interested in security decision-making in dynamic network security problems. Researchers interested in the state-of-the-art research on stochastic game theory and its applications in network security will be interested in this SpringerBrief as well. Also graduate and undergraduate students interested in obtaining comprehensive information on stochastic game theory and applying it to address relevant research problems can use this SpringerBrief as a study guide. Lastly, concluding remarks and our perspective for future works are presented in Chapter 6.
988			_aEBSPRINGER_2018
650		7	_2embne _aRedes informáticas _xMedidas de seguridad _9249221
650		7	_2embne _aTeoría de juegos _9686845
700	1		_aDai, Huaiyu _eautor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _1http://viaf.org/viaf/36592073/ _9673573
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783319758701
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783319758725
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Madrid)
942			_2lcc _cLE
998			_b05/2020 _dz _ek _zSI